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Abstract—Recent work on decision-making and planning for
autonomous driving has made use of game theoretic methods to
model interaction between agents. We demonstrate that methods
based on the Stackelberg game formulation of this problem
are susceptible to an issue that we refer to as Conflict. Our
results show that when Conflict occurs, it can cause sub-optimal
and potentially dangerous behaviour. In response, we develop a
theoretical framework for analysing the extent to which such
methods are impacted by Conflict, and apply this framework to
several existing approaches modelling interaction between agents.
Moreover, we propose Augmented Altruism, a novel approach to
modelling interaction between players in a Stackelberg game, and
show that it is less prone to Conflict than previous techniques.
Finally, we investigate the behavioural assumptions that underpin
our approach by performing experiments with human partic-
ipants. The results show that our model approximates human
decision-making more accurately than existing game-theoretic
models of interactive driving.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wealth of previous research on autonomous driving has
employed overly simplistic models of other agents’ behaviour,
such as assuming constant velocity [11, 17, 8] or that vehicles
can only execute a small number of fixed trajectories for a
given type of manoeuvre [13, 26]. These assumptions can
lead to unexpected and undesirable behaviour, like failing to
change lanes or merge onto a highway, as the models do not
anticipate a driver’s inclination to make space to complete a
manoeuvre if it is initiated. The emerging field of interactive
planning and decision-making for autonomous driving aims
to address these problems by building models that account for
the autonomous vehicle’s (AV) ability to induce behaviours in
other vehicles [18, 19]. For example, the scenario presented in
Figure 1a; the AV (orange) is approaching a parked fire truck
with a vehicle (purple) occupying the adjacent lane. Operating
under the assumption that the purple car will continue to move
at a constant velocity, the AV has no choice but to slow down
and wait until the right lane is empty in order to continue.
In contrast, an AV that is capable of anticipating how an
interactive driver would respond to its actions might decide
on a different course of action; Sadigh et al. [19] demonstrate
an interactive planner that enables the AV to choose behaviours
in order to determine whether the purple car will slow down





LCB (−∞,−∞) (0, 1)
LCA (1, 0) (−∞,−∞)
(b)
Fig. 1: (a): Motivating Example; Car 1 (Orange) is in the left
lane approaching a stopped fire truck. Car 2 (Purple) is in
the adjacent lane. Dotted lines depict the options available to
each vehicle; Car 1 can change lanes ahead of Car 2 (LCA),
or behind Car 2 (LCB). Car 2 can either maintain their current
velocity (C) or yield (Y) to allow Car 1 to merge onto the lane.
(b) Reward matrix associated with the motivating example; Car
2 would prefer to continue, and Car 1 would prefer to change
lanes ahead of Car 2. Diagonal entries in table represent states
where the cars collide or neither satisfies their objective, which
is mutually undesirable.
A common approach to trajectory planning is to develop
hierarchical systems, where a discrete decision-maker decides
on intents or approximate trajectories for the AV, and a lower
level motion planning system chooses continuous actions that
realise these decisions [12, 3, 11, 9]. Incorporating models
of interaction based on Stackelberg games into AV planning
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and decision-making systems has become a popular way of
improving upon naı̈ve models that neglect the interactive
behaviour of other drivers. However, while solving Stackelberg
games is computationally easier than alternative game theo-
retic formulations, the solution method presumes that players
(i.e., the AV and other driver) take the role of either leader
of follower, with the leader selecting their action first and the
follower selecting their best response. In practice, without a
means of direct communication and agreed upon protocol, it is
impractical for two vehicles to dynamically allocate the roles
of leader and follower. Given that these roles are ambiguous,
the assumptions required for a Stackelberg game do not always
hold in autonomous driving scenarios. This begs the question:
will the violated assumptions result in undesirable behaviour?
We use the term Conflict to refer to a class of situations
where ambiguity over who takes the roles of leader and
follower leads to unexpected behaviour. We demonstrate that
such conflicts can result in sub-optimal or unsafe behaviour,
such as both vehicles coming to a stop in an attempt to yield
to each other, or both vehicles aggressively trying to move
into the same space. In addition, we propose a metric—the
Area of Conflict (AoC)—for the rate at which Conflict is
expected to occur in a given Stackelberg game-based model.
This metric can be seen as a measure of robustness to the level
of aggressiveness or passiveness exhibited by other agents in
the driving environment. Using the insight provided by our
Conflict analysis we define Augmented Altruism, a model for
interactive decision-making that is less susceptible to Conflict
than previous approaches. Our approach is based on the
concept of Altruism [5] from game theory, which we extend
to account for reciprocal altruistic considerations of other
agents. Using data collected from both simulated and human
experiments, we demonstrate the impact Conflict can have
on driving outcomes in interactive settings. Our results also
provide evidence indicating that Augmented Altruism more
accurately models human behaviour than current methods.
The key contributions in this work are as follows:
• Identification of a shortcoming in previous work on
interactive planning and decision-making for autonomous
driving that we refer to as Conflict.
• The introduction of a metric, Area of Conflict (AoC), for
measuring the incidence of Conflict for a pair of decision-
makers in a Stackelberg game formulation.
• We propose Augmented Altruism, a novel method for
decision-making that is provably less prone to Conflict
than other methods in literature for reasonable reward
values.
II. RELATED WORK
Our approach is an extension of the concept of Altruism,
as found in Game Theory literature. Andreoni and Miller
[5] presents Altruism as a scalar value, α, that multiplies or
adds with the rewards of the interacting agents to influence
an agent’s decision-making by the potential payoffs to the
other agents. In their work, Andreoni and Miller provide three
distinct models for altruism: pure, duty and reciprocal. The
definition used in this work most aligns with the definition
for pure altruism. [6] introduce selfishness, an equivalent, but
opposite concept to our proposed definition, which is used for
collaborative automotive planning. [10] presents a method for
decision-making for AVs that corresponds to the pure altruism
model, with an altruism coefficient of 1.
Similar to Altruism in Game Theory, there is Social Value
Orientation (SVO) in the fields of psychology and behavioural
economics [16]. SVO can be used as an indicator for a
person’s reward allocation preferences in coordination tasks.
Unlike Altruism, which is restricted to depicting egoistical
or prosocial behaviours, SVO can also identify malicious or
masochistic behaviours in decision-makers. Schwarting et al.
[20] implement a version of SVO where the planning agent’s
reward, and the rewards of the other agents, are weighted
according to the planning agent’s SVO value. We use a similar
approach to incorporate altruism in this work. As in [18],
the authors model the interaction as a Stackelberg game and
demonstrate that SVO can be used to augment lane merge
prediction. In contrast, in this work we use our proposed
method as a decision-making model. In [20] the SVO model
requires access to a single, accurate reward function to model
the behaviour of any other agent, which is learnt offline. In
our work we weaken this requirement, using Game Theoretic
methods to choose the most appropriate reward function to
model the behaviour of other vehicles.
Sadigh et al. [18] present an approach to interactive plan-
ning, in which a reward function is learnt from human data,
and then the structure of the reward function is exploited in
order to identify optimal interactive actions [18, 19]. Fisac
et al. [12] proposes a similar approach, although they do not
rely on knowing the structure of the reward function in their
planning, only that the reward function is known and accurate.
These works formulate the interaction problem as a two-person
Stackelberg game [24] with a dense reward, assuming that the
other agents in the environment abide by the leader-follower
hierarchy specified.
All of these approaches to modelling interaction with
Stackelberg games require the roles of leader and follower
to be agreed upon beforehand in order to avoid undesirable
behaviour. Our theoretical analysis shows that the method we
propose is less vulnerable to this ambiguity than these previous
approaches.
III. CONFLICT IN STACKELBERG GAMES
In a two-person Stackelberg game one player takes the role
of the leader and the other the role of the follower. The leader
chooses the action that maximises their reward, according to
some known reward matrix, under the assumption that the
follower will behave optimally with respect to the leader’s
choice. For example, using the reward matrix given in Figure
1b, if C1 were the leader then they would choose to lane
change ahead of C2 (and get reward of 1) anticipating that the
follower, C2 will respond by yielding (and get a reward of 0).
However, if C2 were the leader instead, they would choose
to continue (and get reward 1) and C1 would be forced to
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decelerate. Thus, if both cars independently assume the role
of leader, C1 will attempt a lane change and C2 will not
yield. This example shows that,if it has not been agreed in
advance which agent is the leader and which agent is the
follower, the uncertainty can result in the agents computing
conflicting equilibria for the game. In the case of autonomous
driving, without any means of direct communication, no such
agreement can be reached. We define Conflict as follows:
Definition. Conflict occurs in a Stackelberg game when a lack
of agreement about who takes the role of leader and who takes
the role of follower leads to the players arriving at different
pure strategy equilibria.
Conflicts can be resolved in one of two ways: (i) enabling
players to negotiate the roles of leader and follower before
playing the game, or (ii) designing the reward such that
the players will arrive at the same pure strategy equilibrium
irrespective of who takes the role of leader or follower.
Conflicts can be problematic as they can result in unforeseen
catastrophic situations, as shown in the previous example.
Therefore it is important that the decision-making method used
by an AV has as low an incidence of Conflict possible, so that it
is robust to the aggressiveness of other agents. In our example
the reward matrix indicates that the players are in Conflict,
and there is no clear way to resolve it.
IV. IMPACT OF CONFLICT
In this section we show how Conflict can impact the ability
of an agent to accomplish its objective in a safe and timely
fashion. We consider the four possibilities; both agents plan
assuming they are the leader, both agents agree Car 1 is the
leader, both agents agree Car 2 is the leader, and both agents
think the other is the leader. When the agents do not agree,
which can occur if there is Conflict in the game, they will
compute different equilibria. We use a simulated highway
lane change driving scenario to demonstrate that this Conflict
can cause sub-optimal behaviour, resulting in longer objective
completion times.
A. Experimental Setup
Each agent i has a finite set of intentions, Ai (e.g., for Car
2, A2 = {Y,C}), with each intention associated with a cost
function, Ja : XT → R, a ∈ Ai, where X is the state space
and T is the trajectory duration. An equilibrium to a game,
(ai, a−i), defines a cost function, Ji = Jai + Ja−i , where
the −i index identifies the agent not indexed by i. In practise








−i), where φ is the vector
of features, and the feature weights, ~wai ∈ RK , where K is
the number of features, are positive, non-zero values that are
defined experimentally. Each agent i uses the cost function Ji
compute an optimal trajectory to achieve the joint intentions.
We treat the problem as a receding horizon optimal control
problem, and use a Model Predictive Control (MPC) planning
scheme to solve it.
The vehicle’s state is defined by its x and y position as well
as its velocity and heading; ~x = [x, y, v, θ] ∈ X . Vehicles can
control their linear acceleration, a, and yaw rate, ω. Control
inputs are of the form ~u = (a, ω). The standard bicycle model,
F : X×R2 → X [14], is used to define the vehicle dynamics.
Vehicles are rectangular with length L = 4.6 metres and width
W = 2 metres. Each lane is 4 metres wide.
At every iteration of the MPC, each agent, i, independently
generates a trajectory x∗i = {~xti}Tt=0, u∗i = {~uti}Tt=0, according









Ji(xi, ui, x−i, u−i)




j) ∀0 ≤ t < T, j ∈ {i,−i}
g(xj) ≤ 0, j ∈ {i,−i}







For each agent i this method also produces x∗−i, u
∗
−i which is
the trajectory agent −i will follow, presuming their trajectory
is also optimal with respect to Ji (this will be the case if
the agents are not in Conflict as they will have computed the
same equilibrium). These values are discarded by agent i. The
vehicles then follow their respective optimal trajectories for
two timesteps before replanning. We presume that at the time
of planning the agents have perfect awareness of each other’s
states. A lookahead horizon of T = 4 seconds is used, with
a timestep, dt = .2 seconds. The experiment finishes when
both agents have completed their objective, or if the trajectory
duration exceeds 10 seconds.
Constraints, g, are applied to the physical state of each
agent; these ensure the vehicles stay on the road, and
that each vehicle’s velocity does not exceed 15m/s. Action
constraints, h, enforce that acceleration is in the range of
[−9m/s2, 3m/s2], and the angular acceleration is in the range
[−1deg/s2, 1deg/s2]. The final constraint is an obstacle avoid-
ance constraint, to ensure that the vehicles do not construct
plans in which collisions occur. An ellipse with semi-major
and semi-minor axes rlong and rlat is fit around agent i’s
position, preventing the vehicles from getting too close. In
all experiments rlat = W + δ and rlang = L + ε where ε and
δ are small constants. An Interior Point Optimizer (IPOPT)
method from the CasADi optimisation library [4] is used to
solve the resulting non-linear programming problem.
We record the time taken for both agents to complete their
objectives, as measured by a boolean check based on the
intention specified in the computed equilibrium. Trajectories
that fail to complete both agent’s objectives (e.g., due to a
collision or frozen robot problem [22]) are given a maximal
score. The hypothesis is that Conflict interferes with the
ability to interact effectively, hence the time for the objectives
to be completed will be longer for those sets of leader-
follower assumptions that are in Conflict. We evaluate this
claim by staggering the starting positions of each vehicle and
recording the completion times. The vehicles are displaced to
a maximum displacement of 1.5 vehicle lengths (6.9 metres).
Empirically we observe that outside this range the cars cease
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to be interacting and can generally accomplish their objectives
without influencing the other’s behaviour.
B. Simulated Lane Change Experiment
Figure 1a demonstrates the default setup for the lane change
experiment; both cars start next to each other in adjacent lanes,
travelling at the speed limit. Car 1 (Orange) can either choose
to change lanes ahead (LCA) of Car 2 (Purple), or change
lanes behind (LCB). Car 2 can either Yield (Y) to allow Car
1 to perform the lane change ahead, or else they can continue
(C). Car 1 would prefer to merge ahead of Car 2, but Car 2
would prefer not to yield, which would prevent Car 1 from
merging ahead (this is captured in the reward matrix defined
in Figure 1b). If Car 1 believes they are the leader, they will
act according to the equilibrium (LCA,Y). If Car 2 uses the
same assumption, they will believe they are the leader, and
will optimise (LCB,C). This results in the action pair (LCA,C)
being executed. Since the equilibria executed by the agents do
not match, we conclude the game is in Conflict.
All Ja, a ∈ Ai ∪ A−i in this experiment have common
features incentivising the vehicles to get into the right hand
lane as early as possible, and to drive at the speed limit. These
features are weighted the same ∀a ∈ Ai∪A−i, so that neither
agent’s cost function prioritises their objective over the other’s.
The remaining feature penalises agent i for being ahead of
agent −i if agent i is expected to yield. This feature is given
as
φk(~xi, ~x−i) = max(yi − y−i, 0)
for some k < K.
The results in Figure 2 demonstrate that when both agents
decide on the same equilibrium (e.g., in the case of (LCA, Y )
and (LCB,C)) the cars are consistently able to resolve the
scenario cooperatively in less time than in Conflict. If both
cars presume the other car is the leader in the Stackelberg
game, they both attempt to accommodate the other, effectively
achieving the equilibrium (LCB, Y ), and they fail to complete
their objectives. Similarly, when both cars presume they are
the leader, they effectively execute the (LCA,C) solution. In
this case the cars almost always fail to complete the task safely.
Even when the cars are not in Conflict, if Car 2 started ahead
of Car 1, and Car 1 is attempting to merge ahead, this can
result in a collision, so Conflict does not entirely eliminate
the risk in the manoeuvre.
V. ALTRUISM AND AREA OF CONFLICT
Altruism-based techniques for decision making in game
theory can be thought of as methods for transforming the
reward matrix of a game. In this section we will define
our variant of altruism [5], as well as an augmentation to
the definition that accounts for the reciprocal considerations
of other altruistic agents. We will also provide a definition
for Area of Conflict, our proposed measure for the expected
incidence of Conflict in a Stackelberg game.
(a)






Fig. 2: Results from Experiment 1. (a) Trajectory duration
achieved in the staggered experiments; each plot depicts the
outcomes for a different action combination. The x-axis of
each plot gives offset of Car 1 (Orange), and the y-axis gives
the offset for Car 2 (Purple) from the default position. (b) The
average trajectory duration achieved over all the experiments




A1 (r111, r112) (r121, r122)
A2 (r211, r212) (r221, r222)
Fig. 3: General reward matrix
A. Altruism
We model the interactive driving decision-making problem
as a static game played on a reward matrix, indexed by
intentions, where each cell in the matrix contains the rewards
received by each player if they each chose the corresponding
intention combination. Figure 3 presents a general reward
matrix where if the row player, R, and column player C, chose
intentions A1,B1 respectively, R would receive a reward of
r111 and C would receive a reward of r112. The grid is 2× 2
for demonstrative purposes and, in general, the grid can be of
any size M ×N where M is the number of actions available
to R and N is the number of actions available to C, and
each cell contains a reward pair (rmn1, rmn2). Unless the full
index is required, we will refer to the row player’s reward for
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a particular intention combination as r1 and, correspondingly,
r2 for the column player’s reward.
Pure Altruism, as defined in [5], makes use of an altruism
coefficient α to define the altruistic reward,
r∗i = ri + αr−i 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (1)
where r∗i is the effective reward agent i uses to perform
decision-making. If α = 0 then the agents are indifferent to
one another and if the value is 1 then the agents are cooperat-
ing in order to maximise the same reward, r∗i = r
∗
−i = ri+r−i.
As an alternative to Pure Altruism we propose an alternative
definition for the altruistic reward,
r∗i = (1− αi)ri + αir−i 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1. (2)
In this case each agent i has their own individual altruism
coefficient, αi. Scaling agent i’s reward in parallel with agent
−i’s allows for more flexible behaviours as compared with
Pure Altruism; if αi = 0 then the agent is wholly egoistic, if
αi = 1 then the agent is wholly altruistic. To avoid confusion
we will refer to the Andreoni and Miller [5] altruism as “pure
altruism” and our proposed definition as “altruism”. We refer
to models that depend on a single interaction parameter(e.g.
Pure Altruism, SVO, Altruism) as “egoistic” interactive mod-
els.
Extensive previous and ongoing work has been dedicated
to estimating reward functions and interactive parameters
[2, 1, 3, 20, 18, 15, 21]. In this work we presume that
the “true” reward matrix {(rmn1, rmn2)}0<m≤M,0<n≤N , and
altruism values α1, α2 are known to both agents. Each
agent can then, independently, construct the reward ma-
trix {(r∗mn1, r∗mn2)}0<m≤M,0<n≤N , which they will use to
choose which intention to follow.
B. Augmented Altruism
When attempting to identify equilibria in Game Theoretic
problem formulations it is not uncommon to use iterative best
response methods to compute the Nash Equilibrium [25]. In
practise this involves each agent choosing an optimal action
based on the optimal actions for the other agents in the
previous iteration. This allows for the fact that an agent’s
choice of action can be affected by the choices made by other
agents. If this process is repeated indefinitely, and it converges
to a solution, then the solution achieved is a Nash Equilibrium
[7].
The altruism definition presented in Equation 2 neglects
from consideration that r∗−i is the reward an altruistic agent −i
would receive from the interaction, not r−i, and that awareness
of this value could affect agent i’s preferences. But, by the
same assumption, the value for r∗−i depends on the value of
r∗i . By treating the equations in Equation 2 as a system of
equations, we can determine the steady state of the system,
yielding what we refer to as “augmented altruism”,
r∗i =
(1− αi)ri + αi(1− α−i)r−i
1− αiα−i
i ∈ {1, 2} (3)
This improves on our base altruism definition, as it is a
computationally tractable method for accounting for both play-
ers altruism values when evaluating options, whereas egoistic
models only account for the agent’s own α. We refer to
models with this property as “non-egoistic” models. For a
more detailed explanation and complete derivation, we direct
the reader to the Appendix A .
C. Area of Conflict
Altruism can be used to resolve Conflict scenarios; in the
example in Figure 1b, if α1 = 1, for instance, then C1 would
get an effective reward of 0 for attempting to cut ahead, and
a reward of 1 for decelerating and allowing C2 to proceed.
However, altruism does not entirely eliminate Conflict since
α1 = 1 and α2 = 1 also results in Conflict.
Let each agent choose an action according to fI : RM×N ×
[0, 1] × [0, 1] → {A1, A2} × {B1, B2}, a function parame-
terised by the altruism coefficients that maps from the reward
matrix to the equilibrium of the corresponding Stackelberg
game for some reward matrix I . The previous observation
indicates that, for a given reward matrix, there are potentially
regions in the parameter-space [0, 1] × [0, 1] that will always
result in Conflict. We call the total size of these regions the
Area of Conflict (AoC). It is desirable to choose a decision-
making method that minimises the AoC for a given reward
matrix.
In the following derivations we will refer to the reward
matrix defined in Figure 3. Without loss of generality we will
assume the cell (A2, B1) is optimal for R and (A1, B2) is
optimal for C. We further assume that there are no ambiguities
in each agents’ rewards, i.e.;
r211 >r121, r111, r221
r122 >r212, r112, r222.
(4)
It is clear that decision-making on the reward matrix with
these constraints will result in Conflict, regardless of the value
of the parameters. Therefore it is vacuously true that if I is
the unchanged reward matrix, then the AoC of the resulting
Stackelberg game is 1 [24]. We will use this value as a
baseline.
In general we observe that Conflict will occur if:
(r∗211 > r
∗
121 ∧ r∗122 > r∗212)
∨(r∗211 < r∗121 ∧ r∗122 < r∗212)
(5)
The definition of the AoC for the following decision-making
models follows from Equation 5 (In order to save space we
will let A = r211 − r121 and B = r122 − r212):

















B < α2 <
B
B+(1−α1A) ∧ 0 < α1 < 1)
In the above it also holds that 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, except in
the case of augmented altruism, where there is the extra
constraint that 0 < α1 < 1. Each of the logical conjunctions
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TABLE I: Calculated AoC values for various interactive decision-making models based on the lane change reward matrix given
in Figure 1b, and general expressions for computing the AoC for each of the methods considered.
Method Lane Change AoC General AoC
Baseline [24] 1 1
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Fig. 4: Conflict regions for various reward models corresponding to the reward matrix in Figure 1b. Red regions designate
regions in the parameter space that result in Conflict. Plots correspond to: (a) Baseline, (b) Pure Altruism, (c) SVO, (d)
Altruism, (e) Augmented Altruism.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5: Plot of the AoC for varying values of A. The Blue
line corresponds to Altruism, the Green SVO, and the Purple
Augmented Altruism. (a) B = 1, (b) B = 3.5.
(∧) specifies a bounded region of parameter space which
will result in Conflict, and the logical disjunctions (∨) define
pairs of non-overlapping regions (see Figure 4 for a graphical
depiction of these regions). Therefore we can define the AoC
as the sum of the areas of these regions in parameter space.
For Pure Altruism, and our proposed Altruism, these are
straightforward computations. For the remaining derivations
we refer the reader to Appendix B. The general definitions
for AoC of the standard Stackelberg Game, the Pure Altruism,
SVO, Altruism, and Augmented Altruism variants are provided
in Table I as well as evaluations corresponding to the reward
matrix in Figure 1b.
We observe that the AoC for the Augmented Altruism
significantly outperforms the other considered models. This
means that, in repeated pairings of agents with altruism scores
sampled uniformly from [0, 1], the incidence of Conflict would
be lowest when using this model. In general we empirically
observe that, for reasonable magnitudes of AB Augmented
Altruism consistently outperforms the other models. Figure 5a
shows the AoC plotted against A, when B = 1. We observe
that for 0.33 < A < 3 Augmented Altruism achieves minimal
values. From Figure 5b we see that when B = 3.5 this range
is 1.6 < A < 10.4. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the
proposed model for minimising Conflict.
VI. HUMAN-AV LANE CHANGE
The previous sections demonstrate that Conflict can cause
inefficient, and sometimes unsafe, execution of interactive ma-
noeuvres. Our additional analysis shows that altruistic decision
makers are able to reduce the incidence of Conflict, but we
have yet to show that human drivers behave altruistically—
a modelling assumption that must be valid in order for our
previous analysis to apply to real-world scenarios.
In order to verify this assumption, we gathered data from
human participants interacting with an autonomously con-
trolled vehicle. In total 11 participants were recruited for
the experiment, collectively contributing more than 1,400
trajectory demonstrations. We investigate the consistency of
the observed data with two models of decision making: a
conventional Stackelberg game that does not take altruism
into account, and the decisions that would be made by an
agent exhibiting egoistic altruism. We hypothesise that data
will support the egoistic altruism model.
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A. Experimental Setup
Participants control a simulated vehicle in a highway lane
change scenario, similar to the scene presented in Figure 1a;
The experiment setting has no obstacle vehicle, as in the figure.
Instead participants are directed to complete the lane change
as early as possible, and the environment has fixed length of
100 metres, simulating the urgency inherent to the presented
scenario. Each scenario starts with the cars next to each other
driving at 5m/s in adjacent lanes. A scenario ends when both
cars end up in the same lane travelling in the lane direction.
The speed of either vehicle cannot exceed 5.5m/s.
The participants control their vehicle using keyboard arrow-
based controls. Participant input is in the form of action
pairs u = (a, ω) ∈ [−3m/s2, 3m/s2] × [−10◦/s2, 10◦/s2].
Before beginning the experiments participants have access to a
sandbox environment enabling them to familiarise themselves
with the controls. This environment is a highway setting,
identical to the experiment setting. The participant vehicle
starts in the left lane travelling at 5m/s. An obstacle car
is stationary halfway along the road in the other lane. This
allows the participant to practise merging manoeuvres in
proximity with another vehicle. The simulation repeats until
the participant is ready to continue on to the experiments.
In the first experiment, participants control the lane-
changing vehicle, and are directed to change lanes as quickly
as possible. In the second scenario the participants control
the lane-keeping vehicle, facilitating a lane change by an
autonomously controlled vehicle. The aim of the AV is to
successfully complete the lane change as quickly as possible.
In all experiments the AV is controlled by a rule-based
controller. When the AV is performing lane-keeping, it initially
follows a constant velocity model. If the participant car
attempts to enter the lane ahead of the AV, it changes models
to an Intelligent Driver Model (IDM) controller ([23]). The
model will either produce “aggressive” or “passive” behaviour;
the “aggressive” model has the AV accelerate to block the
participant’s lane change, and the “passive” model has the AV
slow down and make ample space to complete the manoeuvre.
The parameters of both models are empirically chosen to
demonstrate these behaviours. If the participant car does not
attempt to cut in ahead of the other vehicle, then the AV model
remains a constant velocity model. In the lane changing case
the AV’s trajectory is defined by polynomial curves. Initially
the car follows a “standard” curve that performs a gradual
lane change. If the participant does not yield, the AV will
either aggressively adopt a faster lane change trajectory, or
else it will give up on the lane change and merge behind
the participant instead. The participant is not informed of the
“type” of the AV during the experiment, and the “type” is
randomly sampled at the start of each scenario such that each
participant experienced each AV type an equal number of
times. Each scenario took about 20 seconds to complete.
It is clear from the definition that this formulation matches
the game defined in Figure 1b; the lane-changing vehicle
wants to perform the lane change as quickly as possible,
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: Final relative displacement of the participant car with
respect to the autonomous car. A positive value indicates the
participant ended up ahead of the AV, and a negative behind.
Cars within 5 metres of each other have crashed; a) Results
for the participant lane-change experiment; b) Results for the
participant lane-keeping experiment.
requiring cutting ahead of the lane-keeping vehicle. So the
preferred equilibrium is (LCA, Y ). The lane-keeping vehicle
can accelerate to get out of the way of the lane-changer, which
will complete the manoeuvre quicker, preferring the (LCB,C)
equilibrium. No other outcomes are desirable.
B. Sub-objectives and Altruism
Before each scenario the participants are given a “sub-
objective” indicating how they are to complete their objective
(lane-change or lane-keep). The possible sub-objectives are to
drive:
• “as if in a rush”,
• “considerately”.
Participants are told that the AV also has its own sub-
objective that would affect its behaviour, but they are not
told what the sub-objective is. By withholding this information
from the participant we remove their ability to reason about
the altruism that could be exhibited by the AV, thus precluding
the user from performing non-egoistic altruism. The purpose
of the sub-objective is to induce selfish (low-altruism) and
altruistic (high altruism) behaviour demonstrations. The “type”
of the AV controller, as defined previously, corresponds to the
assigned sub objective. By having the AV’s behaviour depend
on this sub-objective, we can observe instances of Conflict in
human interactions with an autonomously controlled vehicle.
Sub-objective pairs were sampled randomly such that each
combination was observed 15 times per experiment.
Figure 6 gives the final relative displacement of the partic-
ipant controlled vehicle with respect to the AV at the end of
each scenario. We can see that when the participant was given
the “considerate” objective (“consid v self” and “consid v
consid” columns), they consistently allow the AV to complete
the manoeuvre ahead of them. Based on Figure 1b, this is
what we would expect to be the result of a driver with a high
altruism coefficient. We observe that when the participant was
directed to behave selfishly, and the AV was being considerate
(“self v consid”), the participant consistently ended up ahead
    
of the AV. This is what we would expect from a low-altruism
participant and a high altruism AV.
We observe that Conflict is also evident from these results.
In the case when both cars behave selfishly (”self v self”),
the cars crash into each other, as both prioritise completing
their objective over the other vehicle’s. This aligns with
what we would expect from two cars with low altruism
coefficients.1 Based on these results we conclude that the
directions provided to the human participants reliably induced
demonstrations of low-altruism and high-altruism behaviour
in human participants. Collectively, these results support the
hypothesis that egoistic altruism-based models (e.g., altruism,
pure altruism, SVO) can be used to approximate human
decision-making behaviour more accurately than conventional
Stackelberg games.
VII. AUGMENTED ALTRUISM IN HUMAN
DECISION-MAKING
We have shown that Augmented Altruism achieves a lower
AoC score than alternative approaches. While the previous
experiment demonstrates that humans can behave according to
egoistic interactive models (e.g., SVO, Altruism-based models)
when driving, it remains to be shown that non-egoistic inter-
active models (e.g., Augmented Altruism-based models) can
capture the decision-making done by humans decision-makers
more reliably than egoistic models. In [20] it was shown that
the SVO-based model sufficed to capture human decision-
making in a highway setting. In this work we have shown that
our standard Altruism model is equivalent to the SVO-based
model, both of which are egoistic interactive models.
Our hypothesis when defining the Augmented Altruism
coefficient was that human decision-making depends not only
on the planning agent’s altruism coefficient, but also their
estimate of the coefficient of the other agent. In this section we
will validate this hypothesis using results from an experiment
run with human participants driving with an autonomously
controlled vehicle. Specifically, we show that non-egoistic
behaviour is more consistent with the observed data than
egoistic behaviour.
A. Experimental Setup
This experiment immediately followed the completion of
the experiments in Section VI. At the start of the experiment
each participant is informed that the experiment they had just
completed was to do with learning aggressive and passive
behaviour. They are told that, using the demonstrations they
had provided, a model of their behaviour had been learnt,
and that this model could be made more or less aggressive
as required.
The experiment consists of four scenarios, identical to the
previous setup, with the participant performing a lane change
1We note that we do not observe Conflict in the case where both cars
are passive since, for technical reasons, the autonomous car’s behaviour only
changes if the participant is ahead of them. Therefore the mutual yielding
equilibrium is never realised.
Fig. 7: Final relative displacement of the participant car with
respect to the AV. A positive value indicates the participant
ended up ahead of the AV, and a negative behind. The
columns are labelled as follows; more/less aggr: scenarios
when participants were told the AV was more/less aggressive
than them; more/less pass: scenarios when participants were
told the AV was more/less passive than them.
manoeuvre. Before each scenario the participant is given one
of the following notifications:
• The AV would behave more aggressively than their
demonstrated behaviour,
• The AV would behave less aggressively than their demon-
strated behaviour,
• The AV would behave more passively than their demon-
strated behaviour,
• The AV would behave less passively than their demon-
strated behaviour,
The order in which these were presented to the participant
was randomised, and each participant was shown each notifi-
cation once. The resulting behaviour of the participant vehicle
was recorded.
In reality the AV’s model was the same for all the scenarios,
following the passive rule-based IDM controller specified
earlier. The only parameter varied in the experiment was the
participant’s belief about the altruistic tendency of the AV.
B. Results
Figure 7 gives the results from this experiment. If the
participants were performing decision-making purely ego-
istically, per the standard altruism model, then we would
expect to see no change in behaviour resulting from the
different instructions, as these instructions only pertained to
the value of the AV’s altruism coefficient. However, as we
see, distinct behaviours are apparent; when informed they
were less aggressive (or more passive) than the other car,
participants consistently elected to merge behind the AV. When
they were informed of the opposite they chose to merge
ahead of the vehicle. Crucially, this behaviour does not match
the decision-making that would be predicted by either SVO
or standard Altruism. Because information about the AV’s
behaviour changes the trajectory chosen by the participant,
we conclude their model must depend on both the agent’s




In this work we identified Conflict, a vulnerability in popular
decision methods for autonomous driving. We experimentally
demonstrated the significant negative consequences Conflict
can have in common interactive driving scenarios. We pro-
posed a metric, Area of Conflict, that measures the potential
incidence of Conflict for a decision-making method. We de-
rived a novel method for adjusting the values used in decision-
making in such a way to reduce the method’s vulnerability,
and provided theoretical guarantees that the methods reduce
the incidence of Conflict for reasonable reward values.
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APPENDIX
A. Deriving Augmented Altruism
In this section we demonstrate the method for deriving the
definition of Augmented Altruism given in Equation 3 from
the definition of Altruism given in Equation 2. In order to
adequately account for the altruistic inclinations of both agents
in decision-making, we use iterative methods over the system
of equations in Equation 2. We observe that repeated iteration
over the system of equations allows each agent to account
for the other’s altruistic coefficient; after each agent computes
their altruistic reward once, they can repeat the process using
the rewards computed in the previous iteration. This gives us
the following system of equations:
rk1 = (1− α1)r1 + α1rk−12
rk2 = (1− α2)r2 + α2rk−11 ,
(6)
where k ≥ 0 gives the iteration index. Agent i does not iterate
over reward ri as the amount of reward they would get from
achieving their own objective, (1− αi)ri, is known and does
not need to be optimised. Since the altruism coefficients are
bounded, 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, we know this system will converge
(provided α1 and α2 are not both exactly 1, as this renders
the computation unsolvable). We can find the steady state for
this system by solving:
r∞1 = (1− α1)r1 + α1r∞2
r∞2 = (1− α2)r2 + α2r∞1
(7)
This solution gives the definition of the altruistic reward
presented in Equation 3.
r∗i =
(1− αi)ri + αi(1− α−i)r−i
1− αiα−i
i ∈ {1, 2} (8)
B. Deriving Area of Conflict








B + (1− α1A)
∧ 0 < α1 < 1) (9)
By solving these inequalities we get the following definition




























For comparison we can also perform the same evaluation
for SVO [20].
r∗i = cos(θi)ri + sin(θi)r−i 0 ≤ θi ≤ 2π (11)
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By the same procedure as before we observe that Conflict

















Even though the SVO mechanism allows for masochistic
and sadistic behaviours (corresponding to angles resulting in
coefficients with negative magnitudes), to facilitate comparison
we constrain the SVO coefficients to be between 0 and 1. This
implies 0 < θi < π2 . We can therefore compute the AoC for
SVO as:
p1 = max(0,min(
π
2
, tan−1(
A
B
)))
p2 = max(0,min(
π
2
, tan−1(
B
A
)))
AoC =
p1p2 + (
π
2 − p1)(
π
2 − p2)
(π2 )
2
(13)    
